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The brazen escape of notorious drug trafficker Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán Loera from a
maximum-security prison raised major questions about the ability and commitment of President
Enrique Peña Nieto to fight corruption, particularly regarding its connections with organized crime.
When the president announced his anti-crime strategy at the beginning of his administration, he
emphasized that rooting out corruption at all levels of government would be essential to addressing
insecurity (SourceMex, Dec. 19, 2012).
The Mexican Congress took the process a step further, approving an initiative that modifies the
Mexican Constitution to implement broad measures to eliminate political corruption (SourceMex,
April 29, 2015).
Despite these efforts, corruption remains ingrained at all levels of government, with public servants
easily bought by criminal organizations. This was evident in the sophisticated and relatively easy
manner in which Guzmán Loera escaped from the maximum-security facility El Altiplano in México
state on July 11. The leader of the Sinaloa cartel left the prison through a complex tunnel leading
from the prison shower to a newly constructed home about 1.5 km (about 1 mile) from the site.
Authorities said the tunnel was about 70 to 80 cm (two ft) wide and 1.7 meters high (about five ft),
which was tall enough for the fugitive to walk upright. The tunnel, constructed more than 30 ft
underground, was equipped with lighting, ventilation, and a motorcycle on rails that was probably
used to transport digging material and cart the dirt out.

‘We may never see this guy again’
Some reports said the armed forces were not informed about the escape for more than two hours
after the fact. This gave El Chapo ample time to leave the area.
The administration offered a reward of 60 million pesos (US$3.8 million) for information leading to
the arrest of Guzmán Loera. One expert believes the drug capo has a very good chance of eluding
authorities for good, since he was not captured in the days following his escape. "The first 72 hours
are extraordinarily important here," Mike Braun, a former chief of operations for the US Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), told CNN news network. "And if they don't get their hands on
him then, I don't know. We may never see this guy again."
This is the second time that El Chapo has escaped from federal authorities with an extensive use of
insiders, including prison officials. In January 2001, he left the Puente Grande maximum-security
prison in Jalisco state, allegedly by hiding in a laundry cart (SourceMex, Jan. 24, 2001).
Guzmán Loera remained at large for more than 13 years until authorities arrested him at his
condominium in the coastal city of Mazatlán in Sinaloa state (SourceMex, Feb. 26, 2014). El Chapo’s
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capture was expected to have only a small impact on the operations of the Sinaloa cartel, also known
as the Cartel del Pacífico, with Guzmán Loera’s lieutenant, Ismael El Mayo Zambada, running the
operation. Sources say El Chapo actually remained in charge of the cartel, running the operation
from prison with the help of Zambada.

Government ignored warning signs
"What is most surprising to me is that the government has said it was surprised about these
developments," journalist Anabel Hernández, author of the book Los Señores del Narco, said
in an interview with journalist Carmen Aristegui on CNN México. "There were a few very clear
signals that El Chapo Guzmán had succeeded in imposing his will in a very short time on security
personnel and directors inside the prison."
Hernández, whose book is based partly on a study of El Chapo’s day-to-day activities in the Puente
Grande prison, said inside sources told her that the drug capo organized the same type of structure
in El Altiplano, a facility also known as Almoloya de Juárez.
"There were three warning signs that the government chose to ignore," said Hernández. The first of
these signs was the massive hunger strike that Guzmán Loera organized at the prison with the help
of another drug trafficker, Édgar Valdez Villarreal, also known as La Barbie. More than 900 prisoners
participated in the two-day strike to demand better conditions at the prison.
"How did he do it?" asked Hernández. "At that time the government was telling us that El Chapo
was under control in his cell of three to four meters and did not have contact with any of the other
prisoners. There was a series of very tight controls." Hernández said El Chapo was able to organize
and buy the participation of the prisoners through their lawyers and via the cell guards.
The second suspicious action, said Hernández, was a letter from Guzmán Loera to the Comisión
Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDH). The letter complaining about conditions at the prison was
signed by rivals of the Sinaloa cartel, including leaders of the Beltrán Leyva organization, the Gulf
cartel, and the Zetas. "What I find curious is that the signatures were aligned one after another, as if
the document had circulated freely through the penitentiary."
A third warning sign, said Hernández, was an alert from the Comisión Nacional de Seguridad
Pública (CNSP), which indicated that many people using false documents were visiting Guzmán
Loera.
Sources said the Peña Nieto administration also chose to ignore warnings from the DEA just
a month after the capture of the drug capo. DEA sources in Los Angeles said Guzmán Loera’s
collaborators were already planning to break him out of prison at that time. The main instigator
was notorious drug trafficker Rafael Caro Quintero, in a plot that involved threatening or bribing
prison officials. The same DEA probe revealed four months later that Guzman's son Iván Archivaldo
Guzmán had gathered a team of lawyers and military counterintelligence personnel to design an
escape plan.
In the aftermath of the escape, many editorials and columns questioned the incompetence of the
Peña Nieto government and the rampant corruption that allowed the notorious criminal to exit the
prison with such ease.
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"The new escape by Joaquín Guzmán Loera has left many unanswered questions," columnist Raúl
Trejo Delarbre wrote in the daily newspaper La Crónica. "The only explanations of why this escape
occurred are incompetence and corruption. The lack of foresight and gross negligence combined
with the capacity of the drug capo to bribe or intimidate those who were complicit in his flight."
"Chapo’s escape is spectacular as a blatant example of the corruption and complicity inside the
prison system," Eduardo Guerrero Gutiérrez, an analyst at Lantia Consultores, said in an interview
with The New York Times. "The people who worked on the construction of the tunnel took their
time to do it, calmly, with no worries, apparently. They equipped it perfectly, with everything
necessary for a secure escape."

How did El Chapo fool complex security system?
To complete his escape, Guzmán Loera had to bypass five layers of security, each with advanced
technological controls. Additionally, each prisoner is required to wear a bracelet, allowing
authorities to watch the movements of all inmates. Authorities also keep control of prisoners by
closely monitoring conversations with all visitors. "If there were so many levels of security, how
did El Chapo escape?" columnist Raymudo Riva Palacio wrote in the daily business newspaper El
Financiero.
"It is not easy to understand how this individual who the US and Mexican governments have
described as an extremely dangerous criminal, or even the most dangerous criminal in the world,
could have escaped from the most guarded prison in the country," the daily newspaper La Jornada
wrote in an editorial.
"What is unforgivable is not that there was an escape from prison," columnist Víctor Beltri wrote
in the daily newspaper Excélsior. "What is unforgivable is the overconfidence, the arrogance, the
unfettered corruption [that allowed the escape to take place]. What is unforgivable is that there
was no round-the-clock watch on the most wanted criminal in the world and that he was capable of
building a tunnel under the noses of the authorities and walk out of the facility."
The escape adds another layer of embarrassment for the Peña Nieto government because of the
president’s bold statements following Guzmán Loera’s arrest in February 2014. In an interview with
the US-based Spanish-language television network Univisión, Peña Nieto said at that time that it
would be "more than unfortunate, it would be unforgivable" if El Chapo were to escape again. "It’s
the government’s responsibility to ensure that the escape that occurred a few years ago is never,
ever repeated."
Peña Nieto, who was on an official trip to France when he learned of the second escape, scheduled
an impromptu press conference at the Mexican Embassy in Paris to discuss the escape. "I am deeply
concerned," said the president. "This was an unfortunate development."
However, Peña Nieto opted to continue with his schedule in Paris rather than return home, which
prompted some ridicule at home. "It appears evident that the escape was planned at a chosen time,
when the president was away in France with 400 people he invited to accompany him," columnist
Jesús Silva-Herzog Márquez wrote in the daily newspaper Reforma.
"This was a brilliant stroke of political engineering," columnist Julio Hernández López noted in La
Jornada. "Enrique Peña Nieto had left the country (on his way to France with his circle of invitees all
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wearing the colors of the Mexican flag). At the same time, the mole was digging and (for a second
time) declared himself free."
Denise Dresser, a political analyst at Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM), said the
escape is the latest in a series of missteps, acts of corruption, and other problems that have plagued
the Peña Nieto government in recent weeks, including the alleged cover-up related to the massacre
at Tlatlaya in 2014 (SourceMex, July 8, 2015).
"The escape of the capo is cause for laughter because the citizens do not know how to react or what
to demand [from the administration]," Dresser wrote in a column in the daily newspaper Reforma.
"You can add this incident to the list of scandals of the week, the act of incompetence of the month,
or the most recent act of corruption that is revealed but not clarified."
Instead of coming home, Peña Nieto ordered several top aides who had accompanied him on
the visit to France, including Interior Secretary Miguel Ángel Osorio Chong, to return to Mexico
immediately to deal with the situation.
The president also asked Attorney General Arely Gómez González to launch an investigation to
determine whether any government employees at any level were involved in the escape. An initial
investigation resulted in several arrests of individuals of "different levels of government, from high
to low," Gómez González told reporters.
One of the administration's first actions was to summon several dozen individuals, mostly prison
employees, including Altiplano director Valentín Cárdenas Lerma, to Mexico City for questioning
by officials at the Subprocuraduría Especializada en Investigación de Delincuencia Organizada
(SEIDO).
"The challenge is obviously not only to address the immediate problem at hand: the flaws in the
system that allowed the escape and the identity of those responsible at the prison and in adjacent
areas who were working for El Chapo," columnist Jorge Fernández Menéndez wrote in the daily
newspaper Excélsior. "There is also an urgent need for the deep reforms that are required in the
public-safety system in our country. These reforms were not implemented after El Chapo’s first
escape in 2001."

Strategic mistakes
Analysts said several strategic mistakes and miscalculations by the administration weakened the
country’s security structure, which might have contributed to the escape.
A major misstep was the Peña Nieto government’s decision to eliminate the Secretaria de Seguridad
Pública (SSP) and transfer its duties to the Secretaría de Gobernación (SEGOB). Osorio Chong, who
serves as interior secretary, was said to have pushed hard for the consolidation.
"During the transition period, one of the most intense debates within Peña Nieto’s team had to
do with the decision on whether to keep the SSP, a cabinet ministry created by the preceding
administration of the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN)," columnist Carlos Puig wrote in the daily
newspaper Milenio.
"Osorio Chong convinced Peña to make this move despite other opposing points of view within the
team, said Puig. "Thus he gained oversight of the functions of the soon-to-be defunct SSP, including
the operation of federal prisons."
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"There were those who thought it was an administrative mistake," noted Puig. "The question of
public safety was of such magnitude that it appeared impossible that one Cabinet secretary could
oversee the myriad responsibilities."
SEGOB’s duties include management of the population registry code (Clave Única de Registro de
Población, CURP), enforcement of migration policy, oversight of the investigation agency (Centro de
Investigación y Seguridad Nacional, CISEN), protection of human rights, promotion of federalism
and municipal development, rating of movies, and oversight of the federal prisons, among other
things.
Puig said Osorio might not have been up to the task of overseeing security and managing the federal
prison system. "Last year, in an interview with [television host] León Krauze, he asked Osorio if
he was closely monitoring El Chapo to ensure that he did not escape," said the Milenio columnist.
"Osorio’s response was ‘every day.’"
"It appears that this was not the case," added Puig.
Another mistake was the selection of the person to conduct day-to-day management of security
operations in Mexico. "From the start of the Enrique Peña Nieto government several changes were
implemented to demonstrate a different strategy than that employed by [former President] Felipe
Calderón. One was to name Manuel Mondragón commissioner of national security, replacing the
function of public safety secretary," said Riva Palacio. "Mondragón was not selected because of his
capacity to do the job. He was chosen because he was the police chief in the country with the highest
evaluation." [Peso-dollar conversions in this article are based on the Interbank rate in effect on July
15, 2015, reported at 15.78 pesos per US$1.00.]

-- End --
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